Why we learn less from observing outgroups by Kang, Pyungwon et al.








Why we learn less from observing outgroups
Kang, Pyungwon ; Burke, Christopher John ; Tobler, Philippe N ; Hein, Grit
Abstract: Humans are less likely to learn from individuals belonging to a different group (outgroup)
than from individuals of their own group (ingroup), yet the source of this societally relevant deficit has
remained unclear. Here we used neuroimaging and computational modeling to investigate how people
learn from observing the actions and outcomes of ingroup and outgroup demonstrators. Politically
left-wing male and female participants performed worse when observing computer-simulated actions they
believed were from a right-wing outgroup member compared with those from a left-wing ingroup member.
A control experiment in which participants observed choices from a nonhuman agent confirmed that this
performance difference reflected an outgroup deficit, rather than an ingroup gain. Accounting for the
outgroup deficit, a computational model showed that participants relied less on information from outgroup
actions compared with ingroup actions, while learning from outgroup outcomes was not impaired. At the
neural level, the differences in observational ingroup versus outgroup learning were reflected in lateral
prefrontal activity. The stronger the activity in this region, the more strongly participants weighed
ingroup compared with outgroup learning signals (action prediction errors), which formally captured
deficits in outgroup learning. Together, our work provides a computational and neural account of why
people learn less from observing outgroups.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.0926-20.2020






The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
License.
Originally published at:
Kang, Pyungwon; Burke, Christopher John; Tobler, Philippe N; Hein, Grit (2021). Why we learn less
from observing outgroups. Journal of Neuroscience, 41(1):144-152.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.0926-20.2020
Copyright © 2020 the authors
Research Articles: Behavioral/Cognitive
Why We Learn Less from Observing Outgroups
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0926-20.2020
Cite as: J. Neurosci 2020; 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0926-20.2020
Received: 14 April 2020
Revised: 2 November 2020
Accepted: 4 November 2020
This Early Release article has been peer-reviewed and accepted, but has not been through
the composition and copyediting processes. The final version may differ slightly in style or
formatting and will contain links to any extended data.
Alerts: Sign up at www.jneurosci.org/alerts to receive customized email alerts when the fully
formatted version of this article is published.
 
 
Why we learn less from observing outgroups 1 




, Christopher J. Burke
1
, Philippe N. Tobler
1




 Department of Economics and Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, University 5 
of Zurich 6 
2
 Translational Social Neuroscience Unit, Department of Psychiatry, Psychosomatic and 7 
Psychotherapy, University of Würzburg 8 
* shared senior authorship 9 
 10 
 11 
Correspondence to: pyungwon.kang@gmail.com, Blumlisalpstrasse 10, 8006, Zurich, 12 
Switzerland 13 
 14 
Number of pages: 34 15 
Number of figures: 6 16 
Number of tables: 2 17 
Number of words for abstract: 203 18 
Number of words for introduction: 642 19 
Number of words for discussion: 1395 20 
 21 
Conflict of interest statement: The authors declare no competing financial interests. 22 
Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the Swiss NSF (IZKSZ3_162109 and 23 
100019_176016 to PNT). We also acknowledge funding by the German Research Foundation 24 







Abstract  29 
Humans are less likely to learn from individuals belonging to a different group (outgroup) than 30 
from individuals of their own group (ingroup), yet the source of this societally relevant deficit 31 
has remained unclear. Here we used neuroimaging and computational modeling to investigate 32 
how people learn from observing the actions and outcomes of ingroup and outgroup 33 
demonstrators. Politically left-wing male and female participants performed worse when 34 
observing computer-simulated actions they believed were from a right-wing outgroup member 35 
compared to those from a left-wing ingroup member. A control experiment in which participants 36 
observed choices from a non-human agent confirmed that this performance difference reflected 37 
an outgroup deficit, rather than an ingroup gain. Accounting for the outgroup deficit, a 38 
computational model showed that participants relied less on information from outgroup actions 39 
compared to ingroup actions, while learning from outgroup outcomes was not impaired. At the 40 
neural level, the differences in observational ingroup vs outgroup learning were reflected in 41 
lateral prefrontal activity. The stronger the activity in this region, the more strongly participants 42 
weighed ingroup compared to outgroup learning signals (action prediction errors), which 43 
formally captured deficits in outgroup learning. Together, our work provides a computational 44 










Significance statement  52 
Learning from observing others is an efficient way to acquire knowledge. In our globalized 53 
world, “the others” often are people from a different social group (outgroup). There is evidence 54 
that people learn less from observing outgroup individuals compared to individuals from their 55 
own group (ingroup). However, the source of this outgroup deficit in observational learning 56 
remained unknown, which limits our chances to improve intergroup learning. Our results showed 57 
that participants rely less on observed outgroup actions compared to ingroup actions, while 58 
learning from outgroup outcomes is not impaired. On the neural level, this outgroup deficit was 59 
reflected in activation of the inferior frontal gyrus. These findings imply that intergroup learning 60 


















For many different species, including humans, learning from perceiving the actions and 76 
outcomes of others (i.e., observational learning) is an efficient way to acquire knowledge and 77 
skills. There is evidence that observational learning is modulated by important social factors such 78 
as group membership (Buttelmann et al., 2013; Golkar et al., 2015; Howard et al., 2015). For 79 
example, learning appears to be facilitated if participants observe a person from their own social 80 
group (ingroup) compared to a person from a different social group (outgroup) (Golkar et al., 81 
2015; Golkar and Olsson, 2017). This ingroup bias in observational learning was even found in 82 
infants and children being more likely to imitate the novel actions of a demonstrator who speaks 83 
their language, compared with a person speaking a different language (Buttelmann et al., 2013; 84 
Howard et al., 2015).  85 
Previous neuroscience studies have investigated observational learning irrespective of 86 
group membership (Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012; Charpentier et al., 2020; Kumaran et 87 
al., 2015) and reported learning from observed outcomes and from observed actions. Learning 88 
from others’ outcomes and the resulting outcome prediction errors is associated with activation 89 
in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC; Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012; Kumaran et al., 2015). 90 
Learning from others’ actions and the resulting action prediction errors is related to activation in 91 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex/inferior frontal gyrus (DLPFC/IFG; (Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et 92 
al., 2012; Charpentier et al., 2020). 93 
The effect of group membership has mainly been investigated with regard to action 94 
observation or imitation (Losin et al., 2012; Losin and Woo, 2015), revealing ingroup vs 95 
outgroup differences in brain regions associated with mentalizing (Losin and Woo, 2015), and 96 




et al., 2012). However, it remained unclear how important social factors, such as group 98 
membership, shape observational learning mechanisms and the underlying neural circuitries.  99 
In our study, we investigated how group membership affects the neural circuitries of 100 
observational learning. To do so, we combined a well-established observational learning 101 
paradigm (Burke et al., 2010) with social group manipulation, computational modeling and fMRI. 102 
In more detail, participants inside the fMRI scanner observed only choices (i.e., actions) or 103 
choices and outcomes of an ingroup and an outgroup demonstrator, and could use these different 104 
pieces of information to optimize their own choice.  105 
  Based on previous behavioral evidence of outgroup deficits in social learning 106 
(Buttelmann et al., 2013; Golkar and Olsson, 2017), we hypothesized that participants choose the 107 
“correct” (i.e., more rewarding) option less frequently after observing outgroup choices 108 
compared to ingroup choices, reflecting an outgroup deficit in observational learning. Given that 109 
individuals learn from observing A) the outcomes, and B) the actions of others (Burke et al., 110 
2010; Suzuki et al., 2012), we derived three different hypotheses regarding the mechanisms that 111 
might underlie the potential deficit in outgroup learning. According to a first hypothesis, the 112 
outgroup deficit in observational learning may arise because participants rely more on observed 113 
ingroup compared to outgroup outcomes. In computational modeling, this should be reflected by 114 
a stronger weight for ingroup compared to outgroup outcome prediction errors, associated with 115 
neural activation of  the MPFC (Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012; Kumaran et al., 2015). 116 
Alternatively, the outgroup deficit in observational learning may occur because participants rely 117 
more on observed ingroup compared to outgroup actions. In this case, our computational 118 
modeling results should reveal a stronger weight for ingroup compared to outgroup action 119 




2012; Charpentier et al., 2020). Finally, it is possible that the outgroup deficit in observational 121 
learning arises because participants rely more on observing ingroup outcomes and actions, 122 
reflected by a stronger weight for ingroup compared to outgroup outcome and action prediction 123 




fMRI study. Thirty-two participants (19 female, mean age: 22.51±0.54 years) were recruited 128 
from the University of Zurich and a local community in Zurich. Participants were all right-129 
handed, had normal/corrected-to-normal vision and did not have a history of psychological or 130 
neurological disorder. Because our group manipulation was based on political attitude (see 131 
below), we invited Swiss participants who perceived themselves as politically active (i.e., 132 
interested in current political debates in Switzerland) with primarily left-wing attitudes. Three 133 
participants had to be excluded because they showed right-wing attitudes during the group 134 
manipulation check (see below). Thus, we analyzed data of 29 participants in the imaging 135 
experiment.  136 
Behavioral control study. For a behavioral control experiment outside the fMRI scanner, 137 
we recruited another sample of 33 participants (female: 18, mean age: 23.25±3.34). The 138 
participants were recruited from the same participant pool and they matched the participants of 139 
the fMRI study in terms of age, education level, political attitude, and nationality, all ps > 0.171. 140 
All participants received a fixed monetary compensation for their participation and additional 141 
incentives according to their performance. The study was approved by the ethics committee of 142 





Experimental design and statistical analysis 145 
fMRI study. Prescanning procedure for group induction. Before the main fMRI experiment, 146 
participants provided their political views by rating current political issues in Switzerland, and 147 
observed the ostensible ratings of two other individuals. One of these individuals displayed 148 
similar ratings as the participant, indicating a left-wing attitude. The ratings of the other 149 
individual indicated attitudes opposite to those of the participants (i.e., right-wing attitudes).   150 
The prescanning procedure consisted of six trials. In each of these trials the participants 151 
were presented with a political initiative dividing the left- and right-wing parties (e.g., an 152 
initiative to raise inheritance tax). They were asked to indicate their opinion by moving an 153 
abstract symbol on a visual analogous scale (ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 154 
agree”; Figure 1A). Next, participants were presented with two abstract symbols on the same 155 
rating scale that ostensibly indicated the ratings of two different individuals (Figure 1A). One of 156 
these symbols (designated to become the symbol of the ingroup demonstrator) appeared in the 157 
part of the rating scales that indicated agreement with left-wing initiatives and disagreement with 158 
right-wing initiatives, corresponding to a political attitude similar to that of the participants. The 159 
other symbol (designated to become the symbol of the outgroup demonstrator) appeared in the 160 
part of the rating scales that indicated agreement with right-wing initiatives and disagreement 161 
with left-wing initiatives, opposing the political attitude of the participant. The presentation order 162 
of the symbols was randomized across trials. The symbols representing the ingroup and the 163 
outgroup demonstrator were counterbalanced across participants, but remained constant within 164 
each participant. At the end of the group induction, the ratings of participants and the two other 165 




participants of the political attitudes of the other two individuals relative to their own attitude 167 
(Figure 1A).  168 
Next, participants were asked to rate how close they feel to major political parties in 169 
Switzerland ranging from left-wing to right-wing, and to provide the same closeness ratings for 170 
each of the two other individuals whose ratings regarding political initiatives they had observed 171 
before. To do so, participants moved the respective symbols on a rating scale (ranging from 172 
“very close” to “not close at all”). These ratings served as manipulation check of our group 173 
manipulation because they quantified how differently the participants perceived the person 174 
associated with the ingroup and the outgroup symbol, and verified that the perceived differences 175 
resulted in social categorization (here supporters of left-wing and right-wing political parties).  176 
Observational learning task. We used a modified version of an observational learning 177 
task established in a previous study (Burke et al., 2010). The participants were instructed to learn 178 
about the reward probability of two fractal images through observation of only choices 179 
(action_only condition) or choices and outcomes (action_outcome condition) of the two 180 
demonstrators whose political attitudes they had rated outside the scanner (Figure 1A). To do so, 181 
they would observe prerecorded choices that the two individuals (demonstrators) made to 182 
optimize their own outcomes in a previous experiment. Unknown to the participant, all 183 
demonstrator choices were generated by a standard reinforcement learning algorithm with a 184 
learning rate of 0.3 and a beta of 0.4 in each condition. We used this manipulation to ensure that 185 
participants observed identical choices from the ingroup and the outgroup demonstrator, action-186 
outcome condition, F(1,172) = 0.101, p = 0.751, η2 = 0.001 and in the action only condition, F(1, 187 
172) = 0.201, p = 0.655, η2 = 0.001. Moreover, estimating the actually realized betas of ingroup 188 




Thus, participants observed comparable choices (and a comparable learning rate) in the ingroup 190 
and the outgroup conditions, and potential differences between the conditions should result from 191 
the group manipulation (i.e., the differences in the demonstrators’ group membership). 192 
Each trial of the observational learning task consisted of an observation phase (i.e. 193 
observing the demonstrator’s decision) and a decision phase (i.e. making a decision for 194 
themselves; Figure 1C). To prevent confusion between the two phases, the screen was vertically 195 
split in two halves with one half showing the observation phase and the other half showing the 196 
decision phase. The display side of the observation and decision phase was constant within each 197 
participant, and counterbalanced across participants.  198 
At the beginning of the observation phase, the demonstrator for the present trial was 199 
indicated by one of the two previously learned abstract symbols, presented for a jittered duration 200 
of 1-10s. Then, participants had 1.5 s to predict which option the demonstrator would choose. 201 
After response registration (0.5s) and a short interval (0.5s), the action of the demonstrator was 202 
shown for 1s. Depending on the condition, participants then observed the outcome of the 203 
demonstrator (action_outcome condition) or a pixel-matched scrambled image (action_only 204 
condition) for 1.5 s. The scrambled image was made from the outcome presentation part (0 or 10) 205 
and all pixels of the respective outcome were randomly redistributed. After a jittered interval of 206 
1-10s, the demonstrator’s symbol was replaced by the participant’s symbol, followed by the two 207 
fractals (~1.5s). Within this period, the participants selected one of the two fractals. The choice 208 
was displayed for 0.5s, followed by a scrambled outcome image (1.5s), which prevented 209 
individual learning during the task. Learning was incentivized by paying out participant 210 
decisions at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed 211 




they felt during the study in the fMRI scanner. None of the participants reported suspicions about 213 
the experimental setting or inferred the purpose of the study (effect of group membership on 214 
observational learning) correctly.   215 
The fractals were associated with different reward contingencies (70% reward vs. 30% 216 
reward). We used the two conditions (action-outcome vs. action-only) to disentangle action-217 
related learning and outcome-related learning. In the action-outcome condition, participants 218 
could learn from both actions and outcomes of the demonstrators, while in the action-only 219 
condition they could learn only from observing the actions of the demonstrators. The 220 
observational learning task consisted of three ingroup condition and three outgroup condition 221 
sessions, with each session comprising one action_outcome block and one action_only block. 222 
The sequence of ingroup and outgroup sessions was interleaved, and the order of sessions was 223 
counterbalanced across participants. 224 
 Individual learning task. In addition to the observational learning task, participants 225 
performed an individual learning task. The structure of this task was identical to the 226 
observational learning task. However, now the symbol representing the demonstrator was 227 
replaced by a scrambled image, and participants were asked to press a random key instead of 228 
predicting the choice of the demonstrator. At the time when the demonstrator’s choice was 229 
revealed in the observational learning part, both options were highlighted by a frame to keep 230 
action observation uninformative. Participants received the feedback of their own choice during 231 
the decision phase. They performed the individual learning task in a separate block at the end of 232 
the observational learning sessions. For both tasks, we used ten trials per block, which resulted in 233 




Behavioral control study. In the behavioral control study, we investigated observational 235 
learning from a non-social agent i.e., from computer-generated choices. The observational 236 
learning task was identical (i.e. instruction, number of sessions, number of trials) to the 237 
observational learning task of the fMRI study described above, except that participants were told 238 
that they observed decisions generated by a computer. The comparison with a computer 239 
demonstrator enabled us to qualify the social observation effect from the fMRI study as outgroup 240 
deficit or ingroup enhancement. In addition to observational learning from the computer, 241 
participants in the control study also performed the individual learning task, for comparison with 242 
the fMRI study. Moreover, we determined participants’ political attitude based on their ratings of 243 
the same political initiatives as in the fMRI study. Three participants who showed a right-wing 244 
attitude in these ratings were excluded from the analyses. To keep procedures as similar as 245 
possible to the observational learning task, we did not measure beliefs about the strategy, 246 
programming or reality of the computer generated agent.   247 
 248 
Statistical analyses of behavioral data 249 
All the behavioral analyses were performed using SPSS version 23.0 (IBM Corp., 2015). For 250 
most of the analyses, we used a repeated measure ANOVA or a paired-t-test because of the 251 
within-subjects design of the study except the κ analysis. When analyzing the κ of ingroup and 252 
outgroup, Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests were used due to the nonparametric nature of the data. 253 
 254 
Computational modeling 255 
We fitted reinforcement learning models to capture observational learning from actions and 256 




bbmle. For outcome learning, we assumed that participants track the demonstrator’s internal 258 
learning process by simulating outcome prediction errors (sOPE, Eq.1) experienced by the 259 
demonstrator, (Suzuki et al., 2012). These prediction errors correspond to the difference of what 260 
the demonstrator received and the simulated value of the choice made by the demonstrator: 261 
 1.  = _ − _  
For action learning, we modeled observed action prediction errors (APE, Eq.2) which 262 
relate actually observed choice (1, 0) to the learned probability of observing that choice (Burke et 263 
al., 2010).  264 
 2.  =  − _  
To model how strongly participants rely on both of these prediction errors to influence 265 
their own choices, we use weights that update the value Q of the chosen option, similar to an 266 
individual learning rate. Specifically,  denotes the degree to which particpants incorporate 267 
sOPEs to update Q. The larger the , the more heavily participants weighted the sOPEs. 268 
Conversely, the action learning weight κ denotes the degree to which participants integrate the 269 
APE into their own choice. We used Equations 3 and 4 for outcome and action learning and 270 
applied a softmax function with a perseverance parameter (range [0 3]) (Wunderlich et al., 2012) 271 
to convert value into action. Both  and κ had a range of [-1 1], allowing for the possibility of 272 
reverse learning from the outgroup.  273 
 3.  _ = _ + ∗ _ − _  





We assessed observational learning from the ingroup and outgroup by testing models 276 
with separate or common  and κ for the ingroup and outgroup conditions, resulting in four 277 
models in total. All the models were fitted at the individual level. For model comparison, we 278 
calculated the summed maximum likelihood for all conditions and trials for each participant and 279 
used the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to determine the best model.  280 
In addition to the decision for themselves, we modeled the predictions participants made 281 
regarding the choices of the demonstrators, using the most recent sOPE and APE (Eq 5. and Eq 282 
6.) Again, we compared four models with separate or common ϖ and κ for the ingroup and 283 
outgroup conditions to test whether group membership differentially affects prediction learning. 284 
However, we then entered the output of these models into the softmax function to generate 285 
predictions of the decisions of the demonstrator rather than decisions for themselves.  286 
 287 
 288 
As an alternative model family, we considered the possibility that action prediction errors 289 
contribute to the learning process in the action-outcome condition as both action and outcome 290 
information are observable in this condition. In order to test whether adding κ-weighted action 291 
prediction errors to the action_outcome condition improves model fit, we examined the model 292 
family described in Equation 7. The weight parameter captures the relative use of sOPE and APE 293 
for updating Q. We again estimated four models varying whether ingroup and outgroup 294 
parameters were common or separate. The average model fit was worse than for the models 295 
without κ in the action_outcome condition (mean AIC: 17.58 vs. 18.56). Moreover, the best-296 
fitting model of the alternative family explained the data less well than the best-fitting model 297 
 5. _   = _ + ∗ _ − _  




without κ in the action_outcome condition. We therefore used the models without κ in the 298 




fMRI data acquisition and analyses 303 
MRI data was acquired with a Philips Achieva 3T whole-body scanner (Philips Medical Systems, 304 
Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an 8-channel head coil. For each participant, we collected 305 
a T1-weighted whole brain structure image (number of slices: 181, voxel size: 1x1x1mm, field of 306 
view: 256x256mm). To measure neural activity we collected T2* weighted whole-brain echo 307 
planar images (number of slices: 40, repetition time: 2.36s, voxel size: 3 x 3 x 3mm, field of 308 
view: 256x 256mm, echo time: 30ms, flip angle: 90 ).    309 
All functional images were distortion corrected, segmented according to the individual 310 
T1 structural image, normalized, and smoothed with an 8mm isometric Gaussian kernel (full 311 
width at half maximum). Preprocessing and analyses were performed using SPM12 (Wellcome 312 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging). To analyze functional activity, we applied a general linear 313 
model with the following regressors: 1) onset of the screen displaying the choice options for the 314 
demonstrator, 2) onset of the screen displaying the participant’s prediction of demonstrator 315 
choice, 3) onset of the screen displaying the choice of the demonstrator, parametrically 316 
modulated by 4) the APE (see computational model), 5) onset of the screen displaying the 317 
outcome of the demonstrator, parametrically modulated by 6) the sOPE in the action-outcome 318 
condition (see computational model), 7) onset of the screen displaying the choice options for the 319 
 7. _   = _ + weight ∗ ∗ _ − _




participant, 8) onset of the screen displaying the participant’s choice, and 9) onset of the screen 320 
displaying the outcome/masked outcome for the participant. The duration of all events was set to 321 
0. The six head motion regressors and a constant were included as regressors of no interest. 322 
We assessed prediction error-related activity in a random effect model with one-sample t-323 
tests for the contrast images created by the parametric modulators. In order to analyze APE-324 
related activation independently of demonstrator group, we weighted both ingroup and outgroup 325 
action prediction error regressors with a 1 on the first level and used the resulting contrast images 326 
to perform a one-sample t-test against zero on the second level. The same analysis was 327 
performed to assess sOPE-related activation irrespective of group, using the respective first-level 328 
images from the ingroup and outgroup conditions. We also tested for ingroup vs outgroup 329 
differences in APE and sOPE- related activity at the first-level. Finally, using second-level 330 
correlation, we related the differences in behavioral weights (κ) given to ingroup versus outgroup 331 
action prediction errors to differential neural activity induced from observing ingroup versus 332 
outgroup demonstrator choices. We performed whole brain analyses (p<0.05, family wise 333 
cluster-level whole brain corrected with a cluster inducing voxel-level threshold of p<0.001). 334 
 335 
Results  336 
Group induction. Prior to scanning, participants rated their own closeness and the closeness of 337 
the future demonstrators in the observational learning task to left- and right-wing parties. A two-338 
way ANOVA of demonstrator (ingroup/ outgroup) by party (left-wing/ right-wing) revealed 339 
neither a main effect of party (F(1,28)=1.93.59, p=.17, η2 = 0.064) nor demonstrator 340 
(F(1,28)=1.70, p=0.20, η2 = 0.057) but a significant interaction of demonstrator by party 341 




and the future ingroup demonstrator, (t(28) = 15.31, p < 0.001), as close to a left-wing party. The 343 
future outgroup demonstrator was rated as close to a right-wing party, (t(28) = 13.70, p < 0.001) 344 
(Figure 1B). The difference in closeness ratings to the left-wing party between the participants 345 
and the fellow left-wing supporter (ingroup demonstrator) were significantly smaller than the 346 
differences in closeness ratings between the participants and the person they perceived as right-347 
wing supporter (outgroup demonstrator), t(28) = 13.701, p < 0.001. These results show that the 348 
participants perceived one of the demonstrators as a member of their own group (ingroup; 349 
defined by left-wing political attitude) and the other demonstrator as a member of a different 350 
social group (outgroup; defined by right-wing political attitude).  351 
 352 
fMRI study 353 
Behavioral results. In the decision phase of the observational learning task participants made 354 
more correct choices (i.e. selected the option associated with higher reward probability) after 355 
observing the ingroup compared to the outgroup demonstrator (Figure. 2A), group (ingroup, 356 
outgroup), F (1, 28) =7.839, p = 0.009, η2 = 0.219. This difference emerged over time, group x 357 
trial (one to ten) interaction, F (9, 252) = 1.938, p = 0.047, η2 = 0.065. There was no significant 358 
difference between the action-only and the action-outcome condition, condition (action_only, 359 
action_outcome), F(1,28)= 0.988, p = 0.329, group x condition interaction, F(1, 28) = 0.820, p = 360 
0.373, group x condition x trial interaction, F(9,252) = 0.925, p = 0.504. However, separate 361 
analyses for each condition revealed that the effect was mainly driven by the action-only 362 
condition, showing a significant main effect of group (ingroup, outgroup), F (1,28) = 7.421, p = 363 
0.011, η2 = 0.210 and a significant group x trial interaction, F (9,252) = 2.327, p = 0.016, η2 = 364 




group, F (1,28) = 3.323, p = 0.079, η2 = 0.106, and no significant group x trial interaction p = 366 
0.813. Compared to individual learning, participants learned less from the outgroup demonstrator, 367 
F(1,28) = 8.168,  p = 0.008, η2 = 0.226, but similarly well from the ingroup demonstrator, F(1,28) 368 
= 0.174, p = 0.714 (Figure 2A). Together, the results show that participants learned less from 369 
observing the outgroup compared to the ingroup demonstrator, indicating an outgroup deficit in 370 
observational learning, primarily when observing only the actions of others.  371 
Next, we asked if the group difference we observed in choice was mirrored by a similar 372 
group difference at the prediction stage, i.e., when participants predicted the upcoming choice of 373 
the ingroup and outgroup demonstrator. To test this possibility, we conducted an ANOVA with 374 
individual choice predictions and individual choices as dependent variable, and group 375 
(ingroup/outgroup) and response type (choice prediction/choice) as independent variables. The 376 
results showed a significant main effect of group, F(1,28) = 7.472, p = 0.011, η2 = 0.211, a 377 
significant main effect of response type, F(1,28) = 5.492, p =0.026, η2 = 0.164, and a significant 378 
group x response type interaction, F(1,28) = 5.35, p =0.028, η2 = 0.160 (Figure 2B). Clarifying 379 
this interaction effect, post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that participants predicted the 380 
choices of the ingroup and the outgroup demonstrators equally well, t(28) =1.408, Mdifference = 381 
0.027, SE = 0.019, p = 0.171, but showed significantly fewer correct choices in the outgroup 382 
compared to the ingroup condition, t(28) =2.800, Mdifference = 0.112,  SE = 0.040, p = 0.009. Thus, 383 
participants learned to predict ingroup and outgroup choices similarly well, but used the learned 384 
information to a lesser degree when observing the outgroup compared to the ingroup 385 
demonstrator. 386 
  387 




We conducted a behavioral control experiment to clarify whether the observed ingroup vs 389 
outgroup difference in observational learning reflects increased learning from the ingroup or 390 
reduced learning from the outgroup. The control experiment was identical to the main 391 
experiment, except that participants observed choices from a computer, i.e., a non-human agent. 392 
In case of increased learning from the ingroup demonstrator, the number of correct choices 393 
should be significantly higher in the ingroup demonstrator condition compared to the computer 394 
condition. Conversely, in case of decreased learning from the outgroup demonstrator, the number 395 
of correct choices should be significantly lower in the outgroup demonstrator condition 396 
compared to the computer condition. To test this issue, we performed two repeated measures 397 
ANOVAs with trials and condition (action_only/action_outcome) as within subject variables and 398 
demonstrator (ingroup/outgroup, computer) as a between subject variable. The results showed 399 
significantly fewer correct choices after observing the outgroup demonstrator, compared to the 400 
computer, demonstrator, F(1,57) = 14.343, p = 0.0003, η2 = 0.201, mean difference between the 401 
outgroup and the computer conditions: M_combined = 0.142, SE=0.029; M_action_outcome = 0.135; SE 402 
= 0.035, M_action_only = 0.205, SE = 0.038 (see Figure 2C). There were no other significant effects, 403 
condition (action_only / action_outcome), F(1,57) = 0.464, p = 0.499, η2 = 0.008,  demonstrator 404 
x condition interaction, F(1,57) = 1.66, p = 0.203, η2 = 0.008. In contrast to the difference 405 
between outgroup and computer demonstrator, there were no significant differences in the 406 
number of correct choices between the ingroup and the computer condition, demonstrator 407 
(ingroup / computer), F(1,57) =1.639, p = 0.208, η2 = 0.028, condition (action_only / 408 
action_outcome), F(1,57) = 0.090, p = 0.765, η2 = 0.002, demonstrator x condition interaction, 409 
F(1,57) =0.174, p = 0.678, η2 = 0.003, mean difference between ingroup and computer conditions: 410 




0.036 (see Figure 2C).  Individual learning in the fMRI study and control study were not 412 
different, (F(1,58) = 1.031 , p =.314, η2 = .016). These results indicate that the observed group 413 
difference in observational learning reflects an outgroup deficit, rather than enhanced learning 414 
from the ingroup. 415 
 416 
Computational modeling  417 
We hypothesized that an outgroup deficit in observational learning might be driven by 418 
differences in outcome-related learning, differences in action-related learning, or differences in 419 
both learning mechanisms. To test these hypotheses, we fitted reinforcement learning models to 420 
choice behavior when participants observed outcomes and actions from ingroup or outgroup 421 
demonstrators. Model comparisons showed that behavior was best characterized by a model that 422 
used a common learning weight ( ) for ingroup and outgroup outcome prediction errors (OPEs), 423 
but separate learning weights (κ) for ingroup and outgroup action prediction errors (APEs; 424 
Figure 3A). The κ-ingroup weight was larger than the κ-outgroup weight, Wilcoxon Rank-sum 425 
test, z = 3.13, p = .002 (Figure 3B). Thus, model comparison results support the notion that the 426 
differential observational learning effect is mainly due to reduced action-based learning from the 427 
outgroup.  428 
Using a similar approach and models, we performed model comparisons also for 429 
participants’ predictions of the demonstrators’ choices. The best model for prediction behavior 430 
was the model with common learning weight (ϖ) for ingroup and outgroup outcome prediction 431 
errors (OPEs) and learning weight (κ) for ingroup and outgroup action prediction errors (Figure 432 
3C). Thus, our participants learned to predict the choices of ingroup and outgroup demonstrators 433 






Replication of previous results: Observational learning irrespective of group membership.  First, 437 
we investigated if our neural results replicate the findings of previous studies that investigated 438 
observational learning irrespective of group membership, showing activation in MPFC 439 
associated with outcome prediction errors and activation in DLPFC related to action prediction 440 
errors (Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012). To do so, we conducted two separate parametric 441 
regression analyses that regressed the participants’ trial-by-trial model estimates of ingroup and 442 
outgroup outcome-prediction errors and action prediction errors against their neural activity 443 
during the observation of outcomes or actions, respectively.       444 
Group independent outcome-related learning activated a network of brain regions, 445 
including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), bilateral insula, caudate and midbrain 446 
(Table 1, Figure 4A and B). The neural response in these regions increased with decreasing 447 
outcome-prediction errors, indicating that observed outcomes eliciting smaller outcome-448 
prediction errors resulted in stronger activity. At the applied threshold, there was no region 449 
where neural response increased with increasing outcome-prediction errors. Notably, the 450 
DMPFC findings co-localize with previously unreported findings of inverse outcome prediction 451 
error coding in the study of Burke and colleagues (2010; Figure 4A).  452 
Conversely, learning from observing ingroup and outgroup actions activated the anterior 453 
IFG and parietal regions. (Table 2, Figure 5A and B). The IFG findings co-localize with those 454 
of our previous report on action prediction error coding in that area (Burke et al., 2010, Figure 455 





Group differences in observational learning mechanisms. Second, we investigated the brain 458 
regions that are differentially involved in learning from ingroup and outgroup outcomes and 459 
actions. To do so, we contrasted the neural responses related to participants’ trial-by-trial model 460 
estimates of ingroup outcome-prediction errors and action prediction errors with the neural 461 
responses related to their trial-by-trial model estimates of outgroup outcome-prediction errors 462 
and action prediction errors. The results revealed no significant differences at the applied 463 
threshold, suggesting that participants activated similar neural circuitries while learning from the 464 
observation of ingroup and outgroup outcomes and actions. 465 
 466 
Group differences in the weight assigned to observational learning. Third, we tested our 467 
assumption that the stronger weight assigned to action prediction errors in the ingroup compared 468 
to the outgroup condition (Fig. 3B) is related to neural activation of the DLPFC/IFG. Using a 469 
second-level regression analysis, we regressed the behavioral contrast between ingroup and 470 
outgroup action learning weights κ against the neural contrast between the observation of 471 
ingroup and outgroup choices, i.e., the time when observational action prediction error can be 472 
computed. The results revealed only one significant whole brain corrected result, in the left IFG 473 
(MNIxyz: -34, 0, 28, Zstats= 4.07, PFWE whole-brain corrected = 0.041) (Figure 6A and B). Thus, left IFG 474 
activity reflected the impact of action prediction errors on behavior, which was reduced when 475 
participants observed outgroup actions compared to when they observed ingroup actions. This 476 
activity localized in the posterior part of the IFG region that was identified as the key region of 477 






In this study, we investigated whether observational learning is shaped by the important social 481 
factor group membership. We report novel evidence that participants learn similarly well from 482 
observing ingroup and outgroup outcomes, but learn less well from observing outgroup actions. 483 
The observed deficit in learning from outgroup actions provides a plausible source of individuals’ 484 
difficulties to learn from outgroup members, a phenomenon that has been described in previous 485 
studies (Buttelmann et al., 2013; Golkar et al., 2015; Golkar and Olsson, 2017), but so far not 486 
explained. Our neural results not only converge with the findings of previous observational 487 
learning studies in lateral prefrontal cortex (Burke et al., 2010), but also showed that IFG 488 
differentially encodes learning from observing ingroup vs outgroup actions. 489 
 In more detail, our behavioral findings revealed that participants made fewer correct 490 
choices after observing an outgroup demonstrator, compared to an ingroup demonstrator (Figure 491 
2A) or to a computer demonstrator (Figure 2C). These outgroup deficits in observational learning 492 
occurred although participants observed comparable choice behavior in the ingroup and the 493 
outgroup condition and were able to predict ingroup and outgroup choices equally well. The 494 
finding of reduced learning from observing an outgroup compared to an ingroup individual is in 495 
line with previous behavioral evidence (Buttelmann et al., 2013; Golkar et al., 2015).  496 
Extending these previous studies, we used computational learning models to specify the 497 
source of the outgroup deficit in observational learning. Given that observational learning is 498 
based on learning from observed outcomes (Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012; Kumaran et 499 
al., 2015) and observed actions (Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012), we hypothesized that 500 
outgroup deficits in observational learning might occur because individuals rely more on 501 
observed ingroup compared to outgroup outcomes, reflected by a stronger weight for ingroup 502 




deficits in observational learning might arise because participants rely more on observed ingroup 504 
compared to outgroup actions, reflected by a stronger weight for ingroup compared to outgroup 505 
action prediction errors. Our computational modeling results showed that the behavioral 506 
outgroup deficit in observational learning were best explained by a model in which participants 507 
put less weight on action prediction errors elicited by an outgroup individual than on action 508 
prediction errors elicited by an ingroup individual (Figure 3) and put similar weight on outcome 509 
prediction errors from the two groups.  510 
The computational modeling results converge with the behavioral findings that showed a 511 
clear ingroup vs outgroup difference in the condition in which participants could only learn from 512 
actions, i.e., the action_only condition, and a marginal main effect of group (F(1,28) = 3.32, p = 513 
0.079) in the condition in which participants could also learn from outcomes, i.e., the 514 
action_outcome condition. Presumably, the group effect in the action_outcome condition did not 515 
reach significance because the behavioral results reflect a mix of outcome-related, i.e., unbiased, 516 
and action-related, i.e., biased, learning. As computational models establish a relation between 517 
components of the phenomenon being modeled and the components of the model (Stafford, 518 
2009), they can be more sensitive to the latent processes that might drive modulations in 519 
behavior than statistical analyses comparing behavioral outcomes alone (Stafford et al., 2020). In 520 
line with this notion, using computational modeling allowed us to disentangle the mixture of 521 
outcome- and action-based learning, and to specify the effect of group membership on the 522 
different subcomponents of observational learning. 523 
Our neural results revealed that action- and outcome prediction errors elicited by observing 524 
the ingroup and the outgroup demonstrator are processed by similar neural circuitries that 525 




associated with activation in the DMPFC, the insula, the caudate and the midbrain, i.e., regions 527 
that have been implicated in outcome-related learning in previous neuroscience studies (Liu et al., 528 
2011; Sescousse et al., 2013). Conversely, learning from action prediction errors was linked to 529 
neural responses in the anterior portion of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the parietal cortex, 530 
again in line with previous evidence (Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012). Key regions of the 531 
outcome-learning and action-learning networks that we obtained in the current studies showed 532 
considerable overlap with the respective neural circuitries observed in an independent previous 533 
study (Burke et al., 2010) that investigated observational learning independent of group 534 
membership (Figure 4).   535 
Interestingly, although learning from ingroup and outgroup prediction errors activated 536 
similar neural networks, participants put stronger weight on the use of ingroup than outgroup 537 
action prediction error when they made decisions for themselves, which was reflected by 538 
stronger activation in the IFG (Figure 6). The IFG is involved in action-observation and imitation 539 
processes (Caspers et al., 2010) and forms part of the mirror neuron system (Molenberghs et al., 540 
2012). Moreover, there is evidence that the activity of this area is modulated by group 541 
membership. For example, greater IFG activity was found when participants evaluated an 542 
ingroup member based on detailed personal information as compared to an outgroup member 543 
(Freeman et al., 2010). Another recent neuroimaging study revealed stronger activation in a 544 
mirror neuron network including left IFG when participants observed facial emotions of ingroup 545 
individuals compared to outgroup individuals (Krautheim et al., 2019). In line with this previous 546 
evidence, our results show that the processing of perceived actions in the IFG is modulated by 547 
group membership of the demonstrator during observational learning. Extending these previous 548 




social information (here group membership), and thus forms a plausible neural basis for biases in 550 
observational learning. However, the putative link with the mirror system will need to be tested 551 
formally.   552 
It is worth noting the limitations of our study. First, we used exclusively political attitude 553 
to manipulate group membership. Given that previous research described outgroup learning 554 
deficits with group membership based on language or race (Buttelmann et al., 2013; Golkar et al., 555 
2015), it  is unlikely that outgroup learning deficits are limited to the political domain. Moreover, 556 
it is well-established that differences in political attitude foster social categorization, i.e., the 557 
formation of social ingroups and outgroups (Caruso et al., 2009; Rand et al., 2009; Young et al., 558 
2014). There is even evidence that differences in political attitude can override social 559 
categorization based on race (Losin and Woo, 2015). In line with this previous evidence, the 560 
group induction based on political attitude in our study resulted in a salient group membership 561 
manipulation (Figure 1B), a conclusion further supported by our findings of significant 562 
behavioral and neural differences between the ingroup and the outgroup condition. That said, 563 
future research may want to investigate observational learning with a different group 564 
manipulation. Second, we studied left-wing participants only. Although targeting only one group 565 
(e.g. white participants in a study on race) to investigate ingroup-outgroup behavior is common 566 
in the literature (Golkar et al., 2015; Hein et al., 2016), future research may also want to study 567 
right-wing individuals or other political groups to generalize our findings. Third, we used a 568 
relatively small sample size and recent studies (Bossier et al., 2020; Marek et al., 2020) 569 
recommend larger sample sizes to ensure replication of fMRI findings than current practice 570 
(Yeung, 2018). It is therefore noteworthy that we replicate previous findings (Burke et al., 2010) 571 




be re-assessed with a larger sample in the future. Fourth, we did not specify the outgroup 573 
attributes that drive or shape the group differences in observational learning mechanisms 574 
revealed in our study. Future research may want to investigate whether the observed difference 575 
in observational learning arose because participants are less likely to trust outgroup actions 576 
without disambiguating feedback about the correctness of the outgroup demonstrator’s choice 577 
(i.e., the outgroup outcome). Another factor that might play a role is the extent to which 578 
participants dislike the outgroup. In line with the findings of other studies (Golkar et al., 2015; 579 
Hein et al., 2016) it is conceivable that the individual impressions and/or emotions towards the 580 
respective outgroup might modulate the outgroup-related observational learning deficits 581 
observed in our study, an assumption that should be investigated in future studies.  582 
In conclusion, the current results reveal that outgroup deficits in observational learning 583 
mainly reflect decreased learning from observed actions. Our findings suggest that the IFG 584 
differentially weighs ingroup and outgroup action prediction errors and provide a 585 
neurocomputational mechanism for outgroup deficits in observational action learning. 586 
Data and code availability  587 
The behavioral data is available online, https://osf.io/savw4/. Also, the neuroimaging results in 588 
this study can be found in https://neurovault.org/collections/VUOYOUFT/. Code to implement 589 
computational model is available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 590 
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Table 1. Summary of brain regions correlating with -sOPE as a parametric modulator in both 662 
ingroup and outgroup conditions, whole brain cluster-level FWE- corrected p <0.05.  663 
Brain region 
Coordinates 
T value Z value 
Voxels in 
cluster X Y Z 
DMPFC -2 8 54 5.06 4.23 985 
Caudate (L) -16 10 6 4.30 3.73 283 
Insula (L) -42 16 4 4.73 4.02 176 
Insula (R) 38 6 -8 4.62 3.95 263 
Midbrain  -10 -36 -34 4.61 3.94 262 
Precuneus  -26 -54 46 4.61 3.94 247 
 664 
 665 
Table 2. Summary of brain regions correlating with APE as a parametric modulator in both 666 








cluster X Y Z 
Inferior Frontal gyrus (L) -46 8 34 5.12 4.27 951 
Inferior Frontal gyrus (R) 42 6 34 4.94 4.16 799 
Precuneus/Inferior parietal lobe 
(R) 34 -68 40 4.88 4.11 
467 
Inferior parietal lobe (L) -38 -48 44 4.79 4.06 654 
Cerebellum /occipital lobe (R) 30 -62 0 5.70 4.61 1794 




  672 
29 
Figure captions  673
 674
Figure. 1. Group induction, manipulation check, and observational learning task. A) Prior 675
to scanning, participants rated current political issues in Switzerland and viewed ratings of two 676
different persons (future demonstrators) regarding the same issues. B) Participants’ ratings of the 677
ingroup and outgroup demonstrator’s closeness towards a left-wing and right-wing party, based 678
on how the demonstrators rated political initiatives (as in the example shown in Figure 1A). The 679
participants rated the ingroup demonstrator as similar to themselves, i.e., close to a left-wing 680
party and the outgroup demonstrator as dissimilar to themselves, i.e., close to a right-wing party. 681
Blue = perceived closeness of the ingroup demonstrator towards a left-wing (left panel) or right-682
wing (right panel) party; red = perceived closeness of the outgroup demonstrator towards a left-683
wing (left panel) or right-wing (right panel) party. Error bars indicate standard errors of the 684
mean. C) In the main part of the study, participants observed the ingroup or outgroup 685
demonstrator choosing between two fractal images. First, the demonstrator was indicated by one 686
of two abstract symbols (counterbalanced across participants). Then, participants had 1.5 s to 687
30 
predict which option the demonstrator would choose. After response registration (0.5s) and a 688
short interval (0.5s), the action of the demonstrator was shown for 1s. Depending on the 689
condition, participants observed the outcome of the demonstrator (action_outcome condition) or 690
a pixel-matched scrambled image (action_only condition) for 1.5 s. Next, the demonstrator’s 691








Figure 2. Behavioral results. A) Trial-wise percentage of correct choices in the three 700
experimental conditions (ingroup, outgroup and individual learning) of the fMRI study B) 701
Average percentage of correct choices and predictions. Group membership of the demonstrator 702
affected correct choice but not prediction. C) Trial-wise percentage of correct choices in the two 703
conditions (computer and individual learning) of the control experiment. Given that there were 704
no significant differences between the action_only and the action_outcome conditions, the results 705






Figure 3.  Computational modeling results. A) Model comparison based on the Akaike 711
information criterion (AIC) favored the model with a common outcome learning weight  and 712
separate action learning weights κ for ingroup and outgroup demonstrators when participants 713
made decision for themselves. B) Ingroup vs outgroup difference in action learning weight (κ). 714
The weight given to ingroup action prediction errors (κ) was larger than the one given to 715
outgroup action prediction errors in behavior. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. C) 716
Model comparison for predictions of demonstrators’ choices. AIC favored the model with a 717
common outcome learning weight  and common action learning weights κ for ingroup and 718




Figure 4. Outcome prediction error coding irrespective of group. A) Activation in 722
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) correlating with inverse simulated outcome prediction 723
errors (sOPE) in both ingroup and outgroup conditions (red). This region overlapped (yellow) 724
with the DMPFC region that correlated with inverse simulated outcome prediction errors in an 725
independent previous study (green; unpublished data from Burke et al., 2010). For illustration 726
purposes, results are displayed at p uncorrected < 0.001 (see Table 1 for details and whole brain 727
results). B) Bar plot of the DMPFC region shown in red (A), illustrating activity correlating with 728
inverse simulated outcome prediction error for both ingroup and outgroup demonstrators. Error 729









Figure 5. Action prediction error coding irrespective of group. A) Prefrontal regions in left 738
and right IFG correlated with action prediction error (APE) as a parametric modulator regardless 739
of group (red). The region in right IFG overlapped with the DLPFC regions that correlated with 740
action prediction errors in a previous independent study (Burke et al., 2010; yellow / green). For 741
illustration purposes, results are displayed at p uncorrected < 0.001 (see Table 2 for details and 742
whole brain results). B) Bar plots illustrating the relationship between the activity in left and 743
right IFG regions shown in (A) and ingroup and outgroup action prediction errors. Error bars 744





Figure 6. Group differences in neural activity correlating with behavioral effects. A) The 749
ingroup vs. outgroup difference in κ correlated with ingroup vs. outgroup differences in inferior 750
frontal gyrus (IFG, family wise cluster-level whole brain correction, p = 0.041, with an 751
uncorrected voxel-level (i.e., cluster-inducing) threshold of p < 0.001).  For illustration purposes, 752
results are displayed at p uncorrected < 0.001. B) Correlation between individual IFG activity 753
(extracted from the cluster) and κ.  754






